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Abstract. In distributed environments where entities only have a partial view of
the system, cooperation plays a key issue. In the case of decentralized service
discovery in open agent societies, agents only know about the services they pro-
vide and who are their direct neighbors. Therefore, they need the cooperation of
their neighbors in order to locate the required services. However, cooperation is
not always present in open systems. Non-cooperative agents pursuing their own
goals could refuse to forward queries from other agents to avoid the cost of this
action; therefore, the efficiency of the decentralized service discovery could be
seriously damaged. In this paper, we propose the combination of incentives and
local structural changes in order to promote cooperation in the service discovery
process. The results show that, even in scenarios where the predominant behavior
is not collaborative cooperation emerges.
1 Introduction
There are distributed systems where the cooperation of all the entities that participate
in them is required to obtain a good performance that provides benefits for all the par-
ticipants. Some of the scenarios where cooperation is required are: wireless ad-hoc
networks where nodes rely on other nodes to forward their packets in order to reach the
destination node; file sharing in P2P systems [1]; streaming applications [2], discussion
boards [3], on-line auctions [4], or overlay routing [5].
If participants do not to contribute in order to maximize their own benefits and
exploit the contributions of the others, they will obtain a high rate of benefits in the short
term. However, these benefits decrease as the number of selfish participants increases,
thereby damaging the performance of the whole system. There are models of genetic
and cultural evolution that confirm that the opportunity to take advantage of others
undermines and often eliminates cooperation [6]. These cooperation problems are also
known as social dilemmas (i.e., the tragedy of the commons, the free-rider problem, the
social trap). The promotion and stabilization of cooperation in these scenarios has been
considered to be an area of interest [7].
In this paper, we present a proposal that promotes cooperation in the service dis-
covery process among agents that are located in a network structure. In this context,
cooperation plays an important role since agents only have a partial view of the net-
work and need the cooperation of their neighbors to find the required provider agent.
This becomes even more difficult when there are self-interested agents that do not co-
operate with other agents in order to avoid the cost of forwarding queries. Our proposal
combines incentives and social plasticity to promote cooperation during the service dis-
covery process.
The paper is structured as follows. In section 2, we present other works related to
cooperation emergence. In section 3, we describe the model where we integrate the
cooperation mechanisms. This section contains the description of the service discovery
process, presents the incentives mechanism and the social plasticity, and finally we
describe how agents selects each action during the service discovery process. Section
4 presents a set of experiments where we evaluate the performance of our proposal.
Finally, section 5 presents conclusions and final remarks.
2 Related Work
Several mechanisms have been proposed to promote and maintain cooperation in dif-
ferent scenarios. In scenarios where individuals interact repeatedly, selfish or altruistic
actions would be returned in future. Therefore, a common mechanism to facilitate the
emergence of cooperation is direct reciprocity [8]. When agents do not always interact
with the same individuals, indirect reciprocity [9] or tags [10] are used. Punishment
has also been considered to promote cooperation and to overcome the ”tragedy of the
commons” [6]. Punishment is present in human societies where sanctioning institutions
apply a punishment to those that do not obey the law. In systems where such centralized
institutions do not exist, individuals are willing to punish defectors even though this im-
plies a cost for them [11]. In general, punishment has been proven to be an efficient way
to maintain cooperation [12, 13].
Many approaches that are used to promote cooperation assume well-mixed popu-
lations where everybody interacts with equal frequency with everybody else. However,
real populations are not well-mixed. In real scenarios, some individuals interact more
often than others; therefore, to understand the social behavior of the systems it is im-
portant to consider the social structure. The social structure is represented by a network
where links are established by the individuals following certain preferences. There are
several works that analyze the influence of the network structure in the emergence of
cooperation. These works study how structural parameters such as clustering or degree
distribution affect the emergence and maintenance of cooperation [14–17].
Another issue that it is important to consider is how local changes can influence the
collective social behavior. Eguı´luz et al. [18] present a model that uses the Prisioner’s
Dilemma game [19] and social plasticity in random undirected networks of agents.
Agents update their behavior in discrete time steps using an imitation strategy that con-
siders the payoff of neighbors. Agents use social plasticity (i.e., changes in structural
links) to facilitate the replacement of an unprofitable relationship with a new one that
is randomly chosen. Griffiths et al. [20] propose a mechanism that considers context
awareness and tags of agents to promote cooperation. Moreover, agents can remove
part of their connections with agents that are not cooperative and add connections with
others that can improve cooperation. There are other approaches that also make use of
rewiring techniques and partial observation to facilitate the emergence of cooperation
[21].
The majority of the proposals present in the literature considers incentives and local
structural changes in the network separately. In this paper, we integrate both mecha-
nisms and analyze the effect of this integration. Specifically, we present a proposal that
promotes cooperation in the service discovery process among agents that are located in
a network structure. In this context, cooperation plays an important role since agents
only have a partial view of the network and need the cooperation of their neighbors
in order to forward queries to locate the required provider agents. This becomes even
more difficult when there are self-interested agents that do not cooperate with other
agents in order to avoid the cost of forwarding queries. We combine two mechanisms
to promote cooperation: incentives and social plasticity. The main differences between
our approach and other proposals are: (i) we consider the social structure where agents
are located instead of a well-mixed population; (ii) we have considered different criteria
for the assignment of incentives for the agents that participate in the search process; (iii)
local structural changes are also taken into account in combination with incentives; the
structural changes are not random, agents break links with those neighbors that have
non-cooperative behavior, and instead of replacing them randomly, agents look for an-
other agent based on their preferences; (iv) taking into account local information about
the degree of cooperation of their neighborhood, agents are able to detect when it is
more appropriate the use of social plasticity in combination with incentives. The pro-
posed mechanisms have been tested and the results show that even in adverse situations
where there is a large number of non-cooperative (non-cooperator) agents our proposal
obtains good results and the performance of the system is not seriously affected.
3 Model for Cooperation in Service Discovery
Consider a network of agents A = {1, ..., n} connected by undirected links in a fixed
network represented by the adjacency matrix g. A link between two agents i and j, such
that i and j ∈ A, is represented by gij = gji = 1, where gij = 0 means that i and j
are not connected. The set of neighbors of agent i is Ni = j|gij = 1. We assume that
gii = 0. The number of neighbors of i is denoted by ki, which is the cardinality of the
set Ni (see Figure 1).
Agents in the system are characterized by the roles they play. The organizational
role determines the type of services offered by the agent. A role ri is defined by a
semantic concept defined in an organizational ontology, and a set of service semantic
descriptions associated to the role. Each service description si is defined by inputs,
outputs, preconditions, and effects of the services. An agent has an initial behavior that
can be cooperative (coop) or not cooperative (ncoop). Moreover, each agent has an
initial budget b that it is equal for all the agents in the system.
A link between two agents i and j (gij = 1) is established considering a probability.
This probability is based on the similarity between the roles played by the agents i and
j and the services provided by them as well as their degree of connectivity. Therefore,
agents have a greater probability of establishing links with agents that have similar at-
tributes than with dissimilar ones. The result of using this criterion to establish links
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Fig. 1: Service discovery scenario.(a) All the agents are cooperative. Agent i only knows its direct
neighbors k, j, and n. If i needs to locate a service (i.e., rentalCar), it will forward the query to
its most promising neighbor (i.e., k) based on the homophily between the neighbor and the target
agent (i.e., tg) that should provide the required service and the degree of the neighbor. (b) Agents
with thick silhouette are not cooperative. Agent i has to find an alternative agent to k since k
refuses to forward queries.
between agents is a network structure based on similarity and degree that has an ex-
ponential distribution of its degree of connection. This structure facilitates the task of
decentralized service discovery only considering local information. For further details
about the process of network creation we refer the reader to [22].
3.1 Service Discovery
The service discovery starts when agent i ∈ A needs to locate an agent that plays cer-
tain role and offers certain service in order to deal with one of its goals (see Alg. 1). The
agent i, in order to start the process, estimates if it has enough budget b to reach the tar-
get. This estimation is based on the information from previous searches. In the case that
the budget is enough, agent i creates a query at time t, qt = {i, stg, rtg, TTL, ε, {}},
which consists of: the agent that starts the service discovery process i, the required se-
mantic service description (stg), the organizational role that the target agent should play
(rtg), the Time To Live that represents the maximum number of times that the query can
be forwarded (TTL), a similarity threshold ε established by i that represents how simi-
lar should be the service offered by an agent to consider that the target agent has been
found, and the list of identifiers of the agents that participate in the discovery process
(initially this list is empty).
In the discovery process, when an agent that is similar enough to the target is found,
the agent i is informed and the process ends (see Alg. 2 Line 6). Otherwise, agent i
should choose one of its neighbors to forward the query qt (see Alg. 2 Line 28). The
selection of the the most promising neighbor is based on a probability P (〈j, tg〉) that
Algorithm 1 Function that describes how an agent i starts a service discovery process.
1: function startDiscovery()
2: TTL→ 100 /* number of steps associated to the query */
3: path→ {} /* list of participants in the service discovery process */
4: ε→ 0.75 /* threshold similarity */
5: serviceDiscovery(i, i, q = (i, stg, rtg, TTL, ε, path))
6: end function
considers: semantic similarity and degree of connection. The semantic similarity is cal-
culated between the neighbor and the target (i.e., similarity-based factor that considers
the semantic similarity between the services and the roles of two agents) and the degree
of connection refers to the degree of connection of the neighbor [22].
For each neighbor j, P (〈j, tg〉) determines the probability that the neighbor j redi-
rects the search to the nearest network community where there are more probabilities
of finding the agent tg.
P (〈j, tg〉) = 1−
1−
 H(j, tg)∑
k∈Ni
H(k, tg)


kj
(1)
where H(j, tg) is the semantic similarity between the roles and services of agents j
and tg, and kj is the degree of connection of neighbor j. For a detailed mathematical
definition of H we refer the reader to [22]. The agent i selects the neighbor j ∈ Ni that
maximizes the probability P (〈j, tg〉).
FNi(tg) = argmaxj∈NiP (〈j, tg〉) (2)
The discovery process ends when the number of forwards exceeds the TTL or when
the target agent that provides the required service is found.
Actions and Incentives. During the service discovery process, when an agent i re-
ceives a query qt, it has to choose an action ai among a set of possible actions Acc =
{ρ,∞, 1, 2, ..., ki, ∅, λ}, where:
– ρ is asking for a service
– ∞ is providing the service
– {1, ..., ki} is forwarding the query to one of its neighbors ∈ Ni
– ∅ is doing nothing
– λ rewiring a link
These actions have associated a cost, a benefit, or a reward. If an agent asks for a
service to a provider, it has to pay the provider β. If an agent provides a service, it earns
a payoff p. Forwarding a query is costly c, but an agent earns a payoff α if the query
ends successfully. Otherwise, the payoff is 0. If an agent chooses the action ∅, its payoff
is 0. The agent can also decide rewiring a current structural relation with a neighbor and
looking for a new one. The rewiring action has a cost γ . Formally:
Algorithm 2 Function that describes the service discovery process that an agent i carries out
when it receives a query from another agent l. The parameters of the function are: l the agent that
sends the service discovery request, i the agent that receives the service discovery request and qt
the query
1: function serviceDiscovery(l, i, qt = (i′, stg, rtg, TTL, ε, path))
2: /* target agent that represents the profile of a suitable provider agent to solve the query */
3: tg ← (rtg, stg, ∅, ∅)
4: if TTL > 0 ∧ b > costEstimation() then
5: /* if an agent i is enough similar to the target */
6: ifH(i, tg) ≥ ε then
7: /* agent i obtains a benefit for offering the service */
8: piti(behavior)→ piti(behavior) + uti(∞)
9: /* asking a service has a cost for the agent i′ */
10: pit
i′ (behavior)→ piti′ (behavior) + uti′ (ρ)
11: for n ∈ path do
12: pitn(behavior) → pitn(behavior) + utn(atn = ∅ ∧ ∃t′ ≤ t : at
′
n ∈ {1, 2, ..., ki} ∧ ∃j ∈ A :
atj =∞)
13: pit
i′ (behavior) → piti′ (behavior) − utn(atn = ∅ ∧ ∃t′ ≤ t : at
′
n ∈ {1, 2, ..., ki} ∧ ∃j ∈ A :
atj =∞)
14: /* sends an inform to the agent i′ that started the process */
15: inform(i′, i, sq)
16: end for
17: else
18: /* if the agent is not enough similar */
19: /* if the agent has a non-cooperative behavior...*/
20: if i is ncoop then
21: piti(behavior)→ piti(behavior) + uti(∅)
22: rqli ← rqli + 1
23: socialPlasticity(rqli,σ)
24: /* sends a reject message to the agent i′ that started the process */
25: reject(l, i, sq)
26: else
27: /* it selects the most promising neighbor for forwarding*/
28: j ← FNi (tg)
29: /* agent i updates its utility function with the cost of the forwarding action */
30: piti(behavior)→ piti(behavior) + uti({1, 2, ..., ki})
31: TTL← TTL− 1
32: serviceDiscovery(i, j, qt+1 = (i′, stg, rtg, TTL, ε, path ∪ {i}))
33: end if
34: end if
35: /* if the TTL is exhausted */
36: inform(i′, ∅, ∅)
37: end if
38: end function
uti(a
t
i) =

−β if ati = ρ
p if ati =∞
−c if ati ∈ {1, 2, ..., ki}
0 if ati = ∅ ∧ @t′ ≤ t : at
′
i ∈ {1, 2, ...ki}
α if ati = ∅ ∧ ∃t′ ≤ t : at
′
i ∈ {1, 2, ..., ki} ∧ ∃j ∈ A : atj =∞
−γ if ati = λ
(3)
where uti(a
t
i) is an utility function that calculates the payoff obtained by an agent iwhen
it executes an action ati ∈ Acc in time t (see Alg. 2).
Once the service discovery process ends successfully, incentives are distributed
among the agents that participated forwarding a query (see Alg. 1). The use of in-
centives tries to provide a reward the effort to those agents that cooperate during the
discovery process. We have considered different types of mechanisms to distribute in-
centives:
– mechanisms that uniformly distribute the incentives among all the agents that par-
ticipated in the forwarding process of a query that ended successfully. We consider
two different mechanisms that differ from who is the entity that provides the incen-
tives to the other agents. In one mechanism the system is the entity responsible of
providing the incentives to the agents. This mechanism is called System. In the other
mechanism, the agent that initiates the discovery process provides the incentives to
all the participants. We called this mechanism Fixed.
– mechanisms that use a criterion to distribute the incentives in a non-uniform way
among all the agents that participated in the forwarding process of a query that
ended successfully.
• Path: the reward depends on the length of the path. The shorter path to locate
the provider agent is, the higher reward the agents will received. This criterion
tries to reward agents that are part of short paths.
• SimDg: the reward for an agent that participates in the forwarding process de-
pends on its similarity with the target agent and its degree of connection. The
participants that are closer to the target agent (i.e., they are similar to the tar-
get) and have a high degree of connection will receive a higher reward than the
other participants. This criterion rewards agents that are well connected and
close to the target.
• InvSimDg: the reward for an agent that participates on the forwarding process
depends on its difference with the target agent and its degree of connection.
The participants that are distant to the target agent and have a low degree of
connection will receive a higher reward that the other participants. This crite-
rion tries to reward those agents that cooperate although they are distant to the
target agent.
Social Plasticity. The structure of the network influences interactions of agents, there-
fore it is important to provide agents mechanisms to be able of changing their local
structure in the network. For that reason, we consider the rewiring action λ in our
model. Through interactions during the service discovery process, agents are able to
change their structural relations taking into account which neighbors provide profitable
relationships and which do not. This feature is called social plasticity [18]. Social plas-
ticity is the capacity of individuals to change their relationships as time passes. Specif-
ically, in our system, each agent maintains information related to its neighbors. This
information consists of the number of times a neighbor j ∈ Ni has refused to forward
one of its queries (rqij) (see Alg. 2 Line 22-23).
In order to evaluate the utility of a link, an agent i uses a decay function that cal-
culates the probability of maintaining a link with j taking into account the number of
queries that it would have sent through neighbor j but j refused to forward. This func-
tion is a sigmoid that ranges between [0,1].
Pdecay(rqij) =
1
1 + e
−(rqij−d)
y
(4)
where the constant y is the slope and d is the displacement. These constants are estab-
lished by the agent. The most influential constant is d. The displacement d indicates
how benevolent an agent is with respect the non-cooperative behavior of its neighbors.
A high value of dmeans that the agent is going to consider a higher number of refuses in
order to make a decision about looking for another neighbor. A low value means that it
is not permissive with the number of refuses. The function Pdecay(rqij) returns a value
in the range [0,1], where 0 indicates that the agent does not consider that the number of
rejects from its neighbor is enough to make a decision about rewiring, and 1 indicates
that it is necessary to change the link. If an agent decides to break a link, it looks for a
candidate to replace it. The criterion commonly used in other works is random (i.e., an
agents selects a random agent to establish a link). However, in our proposal, agents look
for a neighbor that offers similar services to the previous neighbor in order to maintain
the structure of the network. We assume that agents accept links from other agents since
this fact increases their connectivity in the network.
In order to find a trade-off between the number of structural changes and the emer-
gence of cooperation, the use of the rewiring action λ by an agent is affected by the
number of cooperator neighbors. If the number of cooperator neighbors is under a cer-
tain threshold σ, the mechanism used to facilitate the emergence of cooperation is the
social plasticity combined with incentives. Otherwise, the mechanism used is based on
incentives only.
3.2 Action Selection
Agents choose which will be the next action taking into account: (i) the similarity be-
tween itself and the target agent; (ii) previous actions of their neighbors. An agent
i has an information structure Hti = {piti(coop), piti(ncoop)} that stores information
about the budget that the agent has when its behavior was cooperative piti(coop) =∑
t′≤t u
t′
i (a
t′
i ), a
t′
i ∈ Acc−{∅} and when it was non-cooperative piti(ncoop) =
∑
t′≤t u
t′
i (a
t′
i ), a
t′
i ∈
Acc − {1, ..., ki}. Moreover, an agent i stores the number of times it sends a query to
one of its neighbor j and it rejected forwarding it (rqij).
When an agent i receives a query qt at time t, it chooses one of these actions using
the following criterion:
– do the task itself when its service and role are enough similar to the service and role
of the target agent tg.
ati =∞ if |H(i, tg)| ≥ ε (5)
– do nothing when its service and role are not enough similar to the target agent and,
considering information from previous stages, agent i finds that the neighbor with
highest benefit did not cooperate in the previous stage t− 1.
ati = ∅ if |H(i, tg)| < ε ∧ at−1j = ∅, j ∈ argmax(Ht−11 , ...,Ht−1ki ) (6)
– forwarding the query to one of its neighbors j ∈ Ni(g) when its service and role
are not enough similar to the target agent and the neighbor with highest benefit
cooperated in the stage t− 1.
ati = j if |H(i, tg)| < ε ∧ at−1j 6= 0, j ∈ argmax(Ht−11 , ...,Ht−1ki ) (7)
where
j ∈ argmaxj∈{1,...,ki}P (〈j, tg〉) (8)
– rewiring a link with probability Pdecay when agent i forwarded a query to a neigh-
bor j in the stage t − 1, it rejects forwarding the query at stage t, and the number
of cooperative neighbors is under a threshold σ.
ati = λ if a
t−1
i = j ∧ atj = ∅ ∧ |coop| < σ, coop ⊆ Ni(g) (9)
4 Experiments
In this section we evaluate the effects of different criteria for the distribution of incen-
tives and the social plasticity in the emergence of cooperation in a decentralized service
discovery system.
The tests were performed on a set of 100 undirected networks based on preferences
where the degree of connection followed and exponential distribution. The networks
were populated by 1,000 agents and the average degree of connection was 2.5. Each
agent had a initial budget b = 100. The agents played one role and offered one semantic
web service related to this role. Initially, agents were uniformly distributed over 16
roles, which were defined in an organizational ontology. The set of semantic service
descriptions used for the experiments was taken from the OWL-S TC4 test collection 1.
All the agents in the system had the same probability of generating service queries.
A query was successfully solved when an agent that offered a similar service (i.e., the
degree of semantic match between the semantic service descriptions and roles was over
a threshold ε = 0.75) was found before the TTL (TTL = 100). Different values for
1 http://www.semwebcentral.org/projects/owls-tc/
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Fig. 2: Evolution of metrics when agents use incentives to promote cooperation in the system. Two
initial scenarios are considered: (Left column) the initial cooperator agents were the 60% of the
population, (Right column) the initial cooperator agents were the 40% of the population. The set
of metrics considered were: the average budget per agent with an specific degree of connection,
the degree of cooperation, the percentage of discovery processes that end before TTL, and the
average number of steps in successful discovery processes.
ε and TTL were considered in previous experiments [23]. ε = 0.75 offers a balance
between the degree of similarity and, the success rate and the average number of steps
in the service discovery process. TTL = 100 offers the opportunity to different search
configurations to improve their success rate.
The query distribution in the system was modeled as a uniform distribution. In the
experiments, we made a snapshot of all of the metrics every time 5,000 queries were
solved in the system in order to see their evolution. In all the experiments we did 20
snapshots. The costs, benefits, and incentives of the actions were the following: β =
0.5, p = 0.5, c = 0.01, α = 0.02 (when incentives are distributed uniformly), and
γ = 0.1. For the mechanisms that distribute the incentives in a non-uniform way, agents
distribute the quantity of 0.5 among the agents that participate in the discovery process
considering the different criteria.
The metrics that we considered in the experiments were:
– the success of the service discovery process
– the path length of the discovery process
– the degree of cooperation in the system
– the budget that an agent has.
For the experiments we considered scenarios where incentives are used to promote
cooperation and scenarios where the combination of incentives and social plasticity are
used. Two initial configurations for the network population were also considered. In
one configuration the 60% of agents were initially cooperators and in the other one the
40% of agents were cooperators.
4.1 Incentives
In these tests, we evaluated the different ways that an agent distributes the incentives
among the agents that participated in the process when the percentage of initial co-
operators changes. Figure 2 shows the results in two scenarios with different initial
configurations. The left column shows the results form the scenario where the initial
percentage of cooperator agents was 60%. The right column shows the results where
the initial population of cooperators was the 40%. Figures 2a and 2b show the final bud-
get of agents with certain degree after the last snapshot. The x-axis shows the degree of
connection of the agents and y-axis shows the average budget that agents with certain
degree of connection had available in the last snapshot. In general, agents with a high
degree of connection were the agents that obtained higher benefits due to they partic-
ipated in more service discovery processes, and usually, these processes were shorter
and had more probability of success. The strategies that best distributed the incentives
were the Fixed and the InvSimDg since it gave more incentive to those agents that were
far from the target and had a low degree of connection. In Figure 2b, the budget for the
nodes with a high degree of connection is higher than the results in Figure 2a, since
in the majority of successful searches in the scenario where the initial percentage of
cooperators was 40% the highly connected nodes participated.
Regarding the results related to the degree of cooperation in the system, the strate-
gies that gave a fixed incentive to the participants in the discovery process obtained a
lower degree of cooperation than the strategies that did not distribute the incentives uni-
formly. In Figures 2c and 2d these results are shown. The x-axis shows the snapshots
and the y-axis the number of agents that cooperate. The strategies that do not distribute
uniformly the incentives benefit the highly connected agents of the network, this fact
provides a higher degree of cooperation. In scenarios where the initial cooperators is
high (60%), the strategy that uses fixed incentives also obtains good results. However,
when the number of initial cooperators decreases, this strategy is not enough to promote
cooperation in the system. As consequence of the cooperation promotion, the average
number of steps required in the search process to reach the target agent decreases with
strategies that do not distribute the incentives uniformly (see Figures 2e and 2f). Sim-
ilarly, in scenarios where the initial cooperators are the 60% or the 40% of the initial
population, the percentage of queries successfully solved increases with strategies that
do not distribute uniformly the incentives (see Figures 2h and 2g).
4.2 Incentives and Social Plasticity
In these tests, we incorporated social plasticity. Agents used incentives to promote co-
operation but also they rewired links that they considered that were not being useful.
The values of the parameters in the decay function 4 are: 1 for the slope y and 7 for the
displacement d.
The first set of experiments evaluates the influence of the parameter σ that regulates
the social plasticity action based on the local information about the neighbors of the
agent i. Specifically, sigma is the threshold of collaborative agents that an agent should
have in order to consider the social plasticity action. We have considered the following
values for σ: 0.25, 0.5, 0.75, and 0.95. For instance, the value σ =0.25 means that the
agent will consider the use of social plasticity mechanism if the number of collaborative
agents in its neighborhood is under the 25%. Low values of σ means that the agent is
going to use social plasticity only when the majority of its neighbors does not cooperate.
High values of σ means that the agent is going to consider the use social plasticity al-
though the majority of the neighbors are collaborative. We considered critical scenarios
where the initial percentage of cooperators was the 40% of the network population.
Figure 3 shows the results obtained with different values of σ. With low values of σ,
agents try to avoid the use of social plasticity and only use it in extreme scenarios where
all the neighbors are not cooperative. For the incentive strategies that use a dynamic
distribution of incentives the value of σ does not have a meaningful influence. However,
in the strategies Fixed and System, a low value of σ (σ = 0.25) improves the cooperation
degree of the network, but this improvement is not as significant as with higher values
of σ such as 0.5 or 0.75. The best results are obtained with σ = 0.75. With σ = 0.95
agents use social plasticity almost always, therefore, the majority of non-cooperative
nodes are isolated and the main component of the network loses more nodes than in
other configurations where social plasticity is not used so frequently. As a result of this
experiment, for the following experiments we use σ = 0.75.
Figure 4 shows the results obtained when incentives and social plasticity were com-
bined in scenarios where the initial cooperators where the 60% or the 40% of the popu-
lation. In general, it can be observed that the use of social plasticity improves the results
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Fig. 3: Evolution of the degree of cooperation in the system when agents use incentives and have
social plasticity with different values for the σ parameter.
obtained incentives where only considered and in scenarios where there was less per-
centage of initial cooperators. Regarding the final budget of the agents, the use of social
plasticity implies a small decrease in the budget of the highly connected agents due
to the number of cooperators with a lower degree of connection increases and highly
connected nodes do not play a critical role in the search process.
The improvement obtained with the integration of social plasticity and incentives is
more significant in the promotion of cooperation in scenarios where only the 40% of
the population where initially cooperators. Specifically, the integration of social plas-
ticity benefits the incentive strategies that use a uniform distribution of incentives (see
Figures 4c and 4d). The increase of the degree of cooperation in the system facilitates
the service discovery decreasing the average path length of the discovery processes (see
Figures 4g and 4h) and increasing the success (see Figures 4e and 4f). This improve-
ment is more significant than the improvement obtained only with the use of incentives.
Finally, we analyzed the number of structural relations that were modified using dif-
ferent mechanisms for distributing the incentives (see Figures ?? and ??). The results
show that the incentive mechanisms that distribute the benefit in a non uniform way
require less structural changes to increase the cooperation in the system.
 0
 200
 400
 600
 800
 1000
 1200
 1400
 1600
 2  4  6  8  10  12  14  16  18  20
bu
dg
et
degree of connection
Fixed Path Sim InvSim
(a) Average budget per agent.
 0
 200
 400
 600
 800
 1000
 1200
 1400
 1600
 2  4  6  8  10  12  14  16  18  20
bu
dg
et
degree of connection
Fixed Path Sim InvSim
(b) Average budget per agent.
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(c) Degree of collaboration.
 0
 200
 400
 600
 800
 1000
 2  4  6  8  10  12  14  16  18
coo
pe
rat
ors
snapshot
FixedPath SimInvSim System
(d) Degree of collaboration.
 0
 20
 40
 60
 80
 100
 2  4  6  8  10  12  14  16  18
%s
uc
ces
sfu
l se
arc
he
s
snapshot
Fixed Path Sim InvSim System
(e) % of successful searches.
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(f) % of successful searches.
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(g) Average path length.
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(h) Average path length.
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(i) Rewired structural relations.
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Fig. 4: Evolution of metrics when agents use incentives and social plasticity to promote cooperation in the system. Two
scenarios are considered: (Left column) 60% of the initial population cooperate, (Right column) 40% of the initial population
cooperate. The metrics considered were: the average budget per agent with an specific degree of connection, the degree of
cooperation, % of searches that end before TTL, the average number of steps in successful searches, and the number of
structural relations modified.
5 Conclusions
This article addresses the problem of emergence of cooperation in scenarios where co-
operation is required to achieve a good performance that benefits all of the participants.
Specifically, our proposal focuses on the emergence of cooperation in decentralized ser-
vice discovery scenarios where agents need the cooperation of their neighbors in order
to locate other agents that offer services that they require. Therefore, if selfish agents
appear in the system, in the long term, as the number of non-cooperator agents in-
creases, the service discovery process could be seriously compromised. For this reason,
it is important to provide mechanisms that facilitate the emergence and maintenance of
cooperation. In this paper, we present the combination of two mechanisms to facilitate
the emergence of cooperation in open societies of agents where there are cooperative
and non cooperative agents and they can change their behavior.
In the model that we presented, agents can use incentives in order to promote co-
operative actions such as the forwarding action in the discovery process. We have con-
sidered different mechanisms to distribute these incentives. Some of them take into ac-
count the same quantity of reward for all the participants in a successful search process.
Others distribute the reward among participants non-uniformly considering an specific
criterion. The experiments shown that the strategies InvSim and Fixed distribute the
benefits more uniformly among all the agents than the others. Moreover, the strategies
that promote a higher degree of cooperation in the network are non-uniform.
Moreover, we also considered the inclusion of structural changes (social plastic-
ity) based on the degree of cooperation of their neighbors. As the number of times a
neighbor refuses to forward a query increases, the probability of changing this relation
increases. If an agent decides to change a neighbor, it chooses a neighbor with similar
functional features to the previous one. The inclusion of social plasticity in the system
increases the degree of cooperation achieved in the system, mainly when the incentive
mechanism used is based on a fixed reward distribution. Besides that, the use of social
plasticity decreases the differences among uniform and non-uniform strategies.
The experiments confirm that this combination of mechanisms promote cooperation
in different service discovery scenarios where the number of cooperators is higher than
the number of non-cooperators or where the number of non-cooperator agents is higher
than the number of cooperators. The increase of the degree of cooperation in the system
improves the performance of the system reducing the average number of steps required
to reach the target and increasing the number of service discovery processes. As future
work, we are going to consider new distribution strategies for incentives. Moreover,
we are thinking in distributing the cost of social plasticity action among the agents
that have a connection with a non-cooperator agent and how this distribution affects
to the service discovery performance. Finally, we would like to evaluate other types of
network structures and analyze how this influences in the cooperation emergence.
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